景复朗晚清货币研究

30 Jan 2023

China was neither primitive nor was its economy simple; rather it was vital, changing, developing. But it did not modernize. It did not accept the challenge of the industrial West and "develop" in this special sense of the term.

【读书摘记】

• Frank H. H. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China: 1845-1895, Harvard University Press, 1965。

这部专著记录了十九世纪下半叶 —— 1842年第一次鸦片战争结束至1895年中日《马关条约》签订 —— 清代中国的货币系统如何适应来自外部工业文明的挑战。作者景复朗，中国经济史学家，香港大学亚洲研究中心创始主任（1968-1979），除本书以外，其著作还包括四卷本汇丰银行史。

英国布里斯托大学教授Robert Bickers有一篇纪念景复朗的博文，其中这样写道：

Darwent, minister of the Union Church Shanghai from 1899-1919, was still fairly new to Shanghai, but Frank argued that “foreigners loved to see confusion in the [Chinese monetary] system as it tied in with their views of China in general,” and that anyway they, and “our own contemporaries do not have a clear view of money and banking today.” This seems persuasive, still, perhaps now much more so.

Table of Contents

• 引言
• 第一章 中国货币系统的主要特征
  • 定义与问题
  • 中国货币系统概述
• 第二章 现金部门
  • 三种现金系统
• 第三章 白银部门
• 第四章 银行系统
  • 银行的货币创造
• 第五章 货币体系与政策
• 脚注

引言

自然灾害和地方叛乱是重要时代背景：

During the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911), but excluding the periods 1847-1861 and 1901-1911, there were, on an average, \(27\) droughts and \(44\) floods per century in the home province of Chihli alone. . . . In the great drought of 1876-1879, affecting \(300,000\) square miles in the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, Chihli, Honan, and part of Shantung, some \(9\) to \(13\) million people are supposed to have perished¹. The Yellow River, which tended to break its dikes even in periods of relatively moderate discharge by simply redirecting the impact of its current against them — the river lay, it has been said, on top of the plains, not in them — changed its course in 1852 and flowed north of the Shantung peninsula to discharge into the Gulf of Chihli², with resulting calamitous floods. From 1887 to 1889 it abandoned this course temporarily to flow south again, but now into the Hwai River and the already overtaxed Hungtze Lake. Not only did rivers flood, but the waters were slow to drain from the level plains, and the dikes impeded the natural flow of flood water to the sea.

. . . Coupled with these natural disasters came rebellion and foreign wars. The greatest was the Taiping rebellion, 1850-1864, but the Muslim rising in Yunnan in 1856 and the Nien rebellion³ in the north which followed hard upon the victories of the Taipings required vast expenditures of funds. With the Taipings defeated, the extent of the destruction of China’s richest provices was revealed, prompting a great resettlement migration by a race which had only just moved into the fertile plateau country of Szechuan.

对外战争和对内平叛让各级政府背上巨额外债：

A recent estimate of the external loans contracted by the Imperial and provincial governments from 1853 to 1890 shows that of a total of \(45.3\) million Kuping or Treasury taels⁴, all but \(10.9\) million taels or \(24\) per cent were for external wars (\(14.5\) million taels) or internal rebellion (\(19.9\) million taels)⁵.

一项1926-1936年期间针对中国定县的社会调查揭示了\(515\)个家庭共\(1282\)名\(14\)岁以上男性的从业分布情况。以下数字或许同样可以代表1895年的中国社会：

\(993\)	farming	\(11\)	government
\(64\)	hired farm labor	\(8\)	away from home
\(48\)	student	\(7\)	peddler
\(40\)	unemployed	\(7\)	home weaving
\(25\)	merchant	\(6\)	store employee
\(19\)	education	\(4\)	apprentice
\(17\)	skilled labor	\(2\)	doctor
\(15\)	military	\(2\)	no occupation
\(13\)	unskilled labor	\(1\)	no data

表一（数据来源：Signey D. Gamble, Ting Hsien, a North China Rural Community New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954, p. 62.）

清代中国的税收严重依赖地税：

The basis of the taxation system was the land tax, which before 1850 furnished probably more than \(75\) percent of total imperial revenue⁶. The land tax was usually collected in legal tender in an amount fixed in 1723 by the K’ang-hsi Emperor. Thus the most important source of revenue appeared inflexible, although the amount actually collected exceeded the specified amount more than threefold by the end of the nineteenth century. Such excess sums went to collectors, local and provincial authorities, but not directly to the imperial treasury in Peking. In 1853 the revenue requirements of the governments were so great that the likin tax, a tax on goods in transit, was first levied, accounting by 1900 for \(18\) per cent of the total revenue⁷. With the growth of foreign trade and the efficient administration of the customs under the foreign-staffed Imperial Maritime Customs, import and export duties on general cargo and foreign opium accounted for \(26\) per cent of the national revenue, and the native customs, for duties on trade carried in native-type craft, accounted for another \(2\) per cent.

. . . Likin could not be increased indefinitely, not only for purely economic considerations relative to the disruption of trade, but also due to the complications involved with foreign goods which under the treaties had paid their full duty. And foreigners objected to the tax in principle. The import and export duties were fixed by treaty and could not be increased unilaterally. As they were based on an ad valorem intent but actually set down as specific duties denominated in a silver unit of account, the revenues suffered from a decrease in the gold price of silver, although the full effects of this were not felt until after 1895 when the external gold debt of China was significant.

. . . During the Taiping rebellion the government issued token coins and paper money in an effort to meet the requirements of the military budget and yet maintain vital public works, but more extensive use of this obvious fiscal device was impossible due to the hyperinflation which it produced and the traditional reluctance of the Chinese, a reluctance well justified by experience, to accept government fiat money.

上海、香港，及其他通商口岸的情况：

	1877	1880	1885	1890	1895
股份数（千）	\(84\)	\(69\)	\(289\)	\(878\)	\(1300\)
上海两8（百万）	\(11.6\)	\(13.8\)	\(30.8\)	\(47.2\)	\(57.6\)
英镑（百万）	\(3.6\)	\(3.5\)	\(7.0\)	\(11.1\)	\(8.5\)

表二：上交所总股份数及市值统计

In the thirty years between 1865 and 1895 some \(90\) companies were at one time or another listed on the Shanghai share market. (In considering the companies listed on the Shanghai stock market a few cautions should be noted. First, some of the companies had their head offices outside China, may have operated mainly in other countries, and may have been listed on several other exchanges from which they derived most of their capital. Second, there are no reliable figure as to the percentage of capital invested by Chinese in these companies, although figures as high as \(40\) per cent may be found. Finally, wholly Chinese joint-stock companies having no foreign shareholders were not listed and are considered later.) In addition there were at least \(74\) other companies in Shanghai using foreign machinery or techniques to some degree.

. . . Despite the unsatisfactory scope of the statistics, several further facts emerge. First, the companies were not conspicuous for success. Of the \(90\) companies listed, \(72\) either failed or at some time showed the market value of their shares below paid-up capital. This is consistent with the existence of speculative periods followed by failures of many more concerns than were listed on the stock exchange. These fluctuations were caused by many factors — China’s relations with the Powers, the speculative move of funds from the interior and the resulting land speculation during periods of refugee movements to the treaty ports, the course of the exchanges and other speculative aspects of foreign trade which affected the native money market, and business fluctuations in the United Kingdom, especially the collapse of Baring Brothers and the depression of the early 1890’s.

. . . If institutional factors were the key to China’s slow acceptance of modernization, Hong Kong, a British crown colony, should have been able to set the pace. That it failed to do so despite such obvious advantages as the right of incorporation with limited liability and the protection of a government sympathetic to enterprise suggests that Hong Kong was subject to economic forces similar to those operating in China and that these were unfavorable. The timing of Hong Kong’s industrial revolution, which began during the trade depression following the Korean War-United Nations embargo, emphasizes the importance of the economic factors.

. . . Economic modernization in China prior to 1895 hardly extended beyond the treaty ports. Even in the treaty ports modern industry was restricted to those fields ancillary to the China trade — shipbuilding and processing of exports — while foreign participation in manufacturing industry was hindered by the difficulty of importing machinery over the protests of officials and the desire of the more progressive Chinese to keep modern-style companies in wholly Chinese hands.

第一章 中国货币系统的主要特征

The confusions by which the Chinese monetary system appears to have been characterized are of two general kinds, those common to all metallic monetary systems and those peculiar to the Chinese.

定义与问题

金属货币制度下，货币可以是任何被人们接受的支付媒介。

A metallic currency system may be defined as one in which the assigned value of the commodity used as money is thought to be essentially derived from its market value as non-money.

记账单位和货币是两个不同的概念：

In China the rates for receiving and paying out the same dollar coin were notoriously different. However, originally derived, a unit of account must be considered at any one time to be given datum, that is, to exist independently of any means of payment. . . . A debt expressed in terms of the unit of account says nothing more than that at the time of repayment some sum of money valued at the number of units of account equal to the debt shall be repaid.

. . . If the unit of account is an abstract unit of value and money is but a means of settling debts so expressed, then the debt is not to be settled by a fixed quantity of bullion or a fixed number of coins. The amounts to be paid will depend upon the relationship of money to the unit of account at the time of actual payment. . . . To avoid being repaid less metal or fewer coins owing to appreciation of the metal in terms of the unit of account, the lender could specify repayment by weight rather than value of bullion.

. . . Although governments or merchants’ associations were often successful in keeping money fixed in terms of the unit of account, the relationship eventually broke down. The conclusion must be that in a metallic monetary system every monetary transaction is potentially an exchange transaction. The price of the commodity being purchased having been settled, the price of money must be decided. Contrary to our present-day expectations, people did haggle over money’s price.

“银铜复本位”：

The tael was the unit of account when payment in silver was expected; the ch’uan, when payment was to be in copper coin, or “cash.” A tael could be satisfied by tender of one liang, or Chinese ounce, of monetary silver. The ch’uan was divided into \(1000\) units referred to as ch’ien, and one ch’ien unit of account could be satisfied by payment of one cash coin.

\[1 \text{ 两} = 1 \text{ 川} \equiv 1000 \text{ 钱}\]

重量单位和支付结算单位不同：

\[1 \text{ 两} \equiv 10 \text{ 钱} \equiv 100 \text{ 分} \equiv 1000 { 厘}\]

The ideal nature of one tael being satisfied by one liang of monetary silver is based on the fact that “liang” in Chinese was used both for the unit of account (tael) and for the weight of silver (Chinese ounce or liang) used to satisfy it. Similarly, ch’ien refers both to a unit of account (ch’ien) and a weight (\(0.1\) liang), again requiring a \(1:1\) relationship between the unit of account and its money.

Some of these variations might offset one another, but, given the possibility of variation at so many points, it was unlikely that the ideal model would last long despite the attempts of the Chinese government to maintain it.

The particular evolution of China’s bimetallism may be a function of the metals involved. In Europe silver and gold both served the wholesale sector, and silver could be used for large transactions, although obviously at a relatively increased cost. Should the official ratio be so far incorrect that despite this cost it paid to export gold and import silver, the bimetallism would become de facto monometallism. But in China copper could not serve the wholesale market, and since copper and silver served different functions there was no likelihood of replacing one metal with the other. When the market ratio differed from the official ratio, the undervalued metal was not, on this account alone, exported.

The specific problems which the foreigners chose not to comprehend or selected for negative valuation were: (1) the changing relationship of the copper coins to the silver bullion; (2) the failure of coins to pass at par with their unit of account; (3) the variety of weights, coins, and consequent exchange rates which increased the risk of doing business; and (4) the apparent lack not only of official standards but of any official supervision of the monetary system.

银币经济学：

The very existence of coins depends upon a suitable mint policy or a favorable international trade position, implying an ability on the part of the state to recognize relevant changes in the economic situation and to make appropriate adjustments. To maintain the coins in circulation requires enforcement of the laws relative to counterfeiting, melting, and tampering, while the suer must guard against the tendency of the state to alter the content of the coin for fiscal purposes. To implement its policies the premodern state had but an imperfect police system, inaccurate measures, little relevant econommic information, and no body of generally accepted theory to assist in determining the need for correction of the monetary system. Not surprisingly therefore, maintenance of the coinage taxed the abilities of the most conscientious premodern state, and the coins in the metallic monetary system were subject to chaotic forces inadequately controlled.

A government committed to providing coins will be concerned with shifting the cost to the user. This can be done if the user is willing to pay a premium for the coin, that is, accept the coin in payment for a debt requiring a slightly higher weight of metal tendered in bullion form. The same can be accomplished by requiring a specific payment for the minting process, or seignorage. If the public is unwilling to pay the premium, the government is forced to subsidize the coinage. Thus the very existence of the coins depends upon the availability of funds to meet the subsidy, and in times of crisis the subsidy may be withdrawn, throwing the coinage into confusion and perhaps worsening the crisis.

If the approved coin is to have a fixed relationship with the unit of account, the government must also set a fixed price at which it is willing to accept precious metal at the mint. The establishment of this mint price represents an attempt to keep money fixed in terms of the unit of account by controlling the price of bullion entering into coins. For this policy to be effective the demand for bullion for coinage must dominate the market and thus indirectly set the price for all bullion. The monetary authority may have sufficient political control to set the price of bullion without regard to economic forces, but historical evidence suggests that purely political measures are only temporarily effective. If then the mint price is able to dominate the market price and if the mint charges are not greater than the premium people place on coins, the coinage can be maintained, providing the authority is willing to replace worn coinage, and providing laws relative to counterfeiting and tampering can be enforced.

If the demand for bullion for non-coinage purposes increases so that the market price of bullion is raised above the mint price, because (for example) of an outflow of bullion to meet a trade deficit, bullion will cease to be brought to the mint. Not only will the minting of new coins be interrupted but the established coins will be in danger, for although coins have retained their fixed relation to the unit of account, bullion has not. The market value of the silver in the coins when melted into bullion is greater than the value assigned the silver in the coins plus the premium people place on coins. To save the coinage the government may either cry up the coinage or devalue the unit of account. In the former case it decrees, for example, that a coin formerly worth one unit of account is now worth two. In the latter case it recoins so that there is appropriately less metal in the new coin, its relation to the unit of account being maintained. Inherent in both methods is a change in the mint price of bullion. Crying up the coinage is impractical in a system in which the coins have names identical to the unit of account, although it is logically possible and can certainly be attempted as a temporary measure while new coins are being issued.

The price of bullion in the markets can also be a reflection of increased cost of production. Old sources of supply may become exhausted or more costly to exploit. New sources of supply may suddenly be discovered. Rebellion may cut off supplies. These factors can all affect the market price of bullion unless the demand of the mint suceeds in remaining dominant. If the interruption is thought to be temporary and if the people will place an unusually high premium on coins during this temporary period, the coinage can be saved. But the conclusion must be that constant vigilance is one heavy cost of coinage in a metallic system.

中国货币系统概述

这里实际上探讨的是近代中国经济的货币化问题：

The Chinese economy is the nineteenth century was undoubtedly a monetary economy. . . . There is no economic validity or usefulness in the “dual economy” approach to the study of China; the difference between peasant and city life is rather that, in the former, exchange was more limited. But when exchange occurred it was, with the exceptions noted, a monetary transaction. . . . With the institution of the “single-whip” method of taxation in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643), commutation of the land tax to silver payments had been a consistent policy of the imperial government, so that it appears safe to conclude that by the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911) monetary payments were the usual method of meeting tax obligations⁹. Until early Republican times, however, part of the grain tribute was paid in kind, but in the nineteenth century, owing to the continual trouble the Ch’ing administration had in keeping open the Grand Canal, temporary commutation became increasingly frequent¹⁰. Money was used for payment of licenses and fines, and for the purchase of official rank; similarly, with the exception of the disposal of the tribute grain, the government paid out in money.

在货币领域，中央政府制定基本的政策原则并负有监管之责，而将执行权下放到地方，于是乎不同地方的货币政策各具特色，区域货币系统之间甚至无法做到协调。因此，作者说：

China had neither a unified economy nor a unified monetary system. If China is said to have had an empire-wide monetary system, it is in the sense of possessing certain basic common features established by edict, by a common source of monetary ideas, by similar training of officials, and by the frequent transfer of officials from one post to another. . . . A rough European parallel can be made by comparing the initial monetary edicts of the Ch’ing dynasty with the currency reform of Charlemagne. The local European variations which later developed, and especially the degree to which they developed in the Italian city states, are indications that the origiinal model had broken down.

在对外关系领域，中国特色的央地关系较难被外国人理解：

A study of the Chinese monetary system . . . must both recount the numerous local variations in content and policy and direct itself primarily to the imperial aspects of policy. The local details were not, as foreign observers thought, the aberrations of a national system permitted by a weak central authority, but were rather natural and integral parts of a system in an empire in which the local economies had not been, and probably could not be, integrated immediately into a national economy. The disagreements between the Chinese government and the foreign powers in monetary matters were based on this misunderstanding — foreign insistence that China act as if the monetary system were or ought to be a single unified system, and Chinese unwillingness or inability to do so.

中央政府没有能力维持币值稳定，一方面，伪造、仿制货币难以禁绝，另一方面，来自外贸收入的银币超出了政府管制范围：

Governments in premodern times generally found it difficult to enforce their currency laws, but if one single feature of the Chinese monetary system were to be selected as unusual, it would be the complete inability of the imperial government to maintain the standard of its coins or prevent counterfeiting and general tampering with the coinage. This ineffectiveness was only partly the result of the political system. The method of casting the copper coin was primitive and less accurate than European methods. The resulting faults in the legal coinage encouraged imitators and led to a progressive deterioration which the imperial government proved powerless to check. The currency of substandard coins encouraged officials themselves to issue substandard coins from the provincial mints, a practice which made the legal coins suspect and later hindered the acceptance of a Chinese dollar coin. The legal inflexibility of the tax system forced the government to tamper with its own copper-silver exchange rates; the shortage of revenue encouraged the government to initiate token currency plans which failed. Unable to enforce its currency regulations except where economic conditions alone guaranteed their success, the government’s range of maneuver in monetary policy was curtailed to an extent unusual in a metallic monetary system.

In the traditional system the Chinese government undertook responsibility only for the coining of copper. Silver circulated in bullion form until the introduction through foreign trade of the Spanish dollar. Typical of the Chinese monetary system, therefore, was the existence of a silver coinage over which China itself had no control, the supplies of which depended upon the policies of foreign governments, especially of Mexico. The design and sometimes the content of dollar coins varied with a change of reigns, the need for currency reform in the issuing country, or a change of government in the South American republics. The French occupation of Mexico, for example, resulted in changes in the design of the Mexican dollar. The new “Eagle dollar” was assayed officially in Shanghai and found \(1.5\%\) better than the old, and was then accepted by the Customs in 1872.

第二章 现金部门

The cash and silver systems were part of a parallel bimetallic system and their relative values were determined by market forces. The changes in the cash-silver exchange rate had to be taken into consideration in any commercial venture, but, as the factors involved in the changes appeared esoteric to the foreign merchant, internal trade was the more easily kept in the hands of the compradore and the local Chinese merchant. There was thus a corresponding loss of foreign control of the export trade, which not only was a source of annoyance and complaint to the foreigner but also, by keeping him economically separated from the point of production, made it impossible for him to enforce his specific demands relative to the quality of the product brought down to the coast for sale. These serious consequences cannot be attributed fairly to the cash system alone, however, as the Chinese had other, surer ways of maintaining control of their internal trade.

三种现金系统

The ch’ang-ch’ien system was one, then, in which the tender of one cash coin satisfied a debt of one ch’ien, or, to distinguish this unit of account from the ch’ien units of the other systems, one ch’ang-ch’ien. The ch’ang-ch’ien system had two units of account, the ch’uan and the ch’ien or ch’ang-ch’ien. One thousand ch’ien were equal in value to one ch’uan. A debt of one ch’ien could be satisfied by payment of a single standard cash coin; a ch’uan by \(1000\) such coins or by a lesser number as customary in the particular market. In some localities the ch’uan was known as the min, or tiao, or, as in Shanghai and Fukien, simply as i-ch’ien (one thousand), but this was a matter of local custom.

In the chung-ch’ien model, which was typical of Chihli, Shantung, Kansu, and Kirin, the number of cash coins required to satisfy a debt of one tael remains the same as in the ch’ang-ch’ien model, but since each coin satisfies twice as many ch’ien units of account, the model has had to be changed by doubling the units of account equal to one tael. The chung-ch’ien system also had two units of account, the ch’uan or tiao and the ch’ien or chung-ch’ien.

The hsiao-ch’ien system was typical of Fengtian and Ying-kou and had tiao and ch’ien —— kuan-tung-ch’ien or tung-ch’ien —— units of account, but a debt of a tiao could be settled by the payment of \(160\) cash coins. The \(160\) coins were strung together, and there was thus no sub-string in the hsian-ch’ien system.

第三章 白银部门

Tael, which is said to derive from the Hindu tola, is the standard translation for “liang,” both when that term refers to a unit of account and to a unit of weight. In the former case, to avoid confusion such terms as “monetary tael” or “tael of account” may also be used, similar to the term pound sterling.

Silver bullion in China was available in three main forms: ingots, fragments, and bars. The first two are types of sycee or monetary silver; the third, bar silver, was imported in this form and used almost exclusively for international trade or, possibly, for hoarding. To pass current in monetary transactions, bar silver had to be converted into sycee ingots. The most important form of silver bullion in China’s monetary system was the sycee ingot of proximately \(50\) liang, known as the “shoe of sycee” and in Chinese called variously yüan-pao, tso-pao-yin, or tso-ma-t’i —— the last name, it is said, because of its imagined resemblance to a horse’s hoof, hence, in English, “shoe.” The chung-ting was an ingot of approximately ten liang; the hsiao-k’o or k’o-tzu, the small ingot of silver, might weigh five liang or under. Colloquially these smaller ingots were sometimes referred to as man-t’ou because of their resemblance to the shape of steamed bread. When a payment required tender of portions of these ingots, the correct amount would be cut off and weighed. Such a process would eventually leave broken silver, sui-yin, or miscellaneous fragments, san-sui —— one name for which, ti-chu or beads of silver, was again descriptive of shape¹¹.

There were several reasons why the tael price of sycee did not change daily: first, the banks, with their transfer system working on a principle similar to the checking account, provided temporary flexibility; secondly, seasonal variations in demand for sycee could be at least partially anticipated; and thirdly, the tendency for money and the unit of account to remain fixed, reinforaced by the tael-liang nomenclature itself, which implied a fixed relationship, made it more likely that changes in the supply and demand for silver should be manifested in the interregional exchanges or in the local commodity price level, rather than in a changed relationship between money and the unit of account.

The traditional silver bullion system was modified by the introduction of dollar coins minted outside China and imported in the course of international trade. . . . The nominal relationship between the tael and the dollar unit of account throughout the nineteenth century was \(72:100\), a relationship based originally on the fact that the dollar of fineness equal to the sycee in Canton weighed \(0.72\) of a Canton liang. . . . In the period 1845-1895 the dollar’s original role as an alternative and slightly preferred means of payment by the East India Company had changed, and the dollar played different roles in different centers.

Some retail prices may be quoted in terms of the coin, in which case the seller is taking on himself the exchange risk. But for larger transactions quotations are in the unit of account, and dollars are accepted at the rate of the day, if indeed they are accepted at all. This was the situation in China after 1857 in many of the northern ports and in Shanghai itself. The dollar played a subsidiary role to sycee, although it was common tender and generally acceptable at market rates quoted in the newspapers and at banks. It was not a subsidiary coin in the sense that its assigned value was an arbitrary fraction of the unit of account, because the price of the coin was affected by the demand for and supply of dollars.

第四章 银行系统

The evolution of the banking system in China is a local story, with variations in each commercial center. The following description is an attempt to generalize by characterizing the most important features. The pattern consisted of a multiplicity of small banks, the larger of which were joined in a bankers’ guild. In Shanghai there were \(120\) native banks in the foreign settlement as early as 1858. Of these some eight to ten were “large” banks with a nominal capital of \(30,000\) to \(50,000\) taels; fifty were “small” banks with a capital of only \(500\) to \(1,000\) taels; the remainder were in the \(5,000\) to \(10,000\) tael category. The money-lenders of Shantung were reported as having a capital of \(2,000\) to \(3,000\) taels, whereas in Foochow there were sixty banks with a capital of \(20,000\) to \(50,000\) taels. Obviously the number of banks and their capital were directly related to the importance of the trade of the treaty port. The smaller ports were served only by banking agencies or even by merchants performing some of the functions of bankers.

The banks were either family-owned or partnerships, usually managed by an employee who was given sole responsibility during the tenure of his contract. The banks made advances, undertook exchange business (either with their own agents, through the Shansi banks, or through foreign banks), accepted deposits at rates of interest which do not appear to have exceeded \(12\) per cent per annum, and undertook personal loans. The large banks of Shanghai, for example, made advances to junk owners on the security of their vessels when they took the tribute rice north so that they might return with cargoes of oil, peas, bean cake, and other products. The banks also speculated in the exchanges, in gold, silver, and dollars, and later in both merchandise and Shanghai shares. Some banks might specialize in advances on certain types of merchandise, especially those involved in the opium trade, and all had their local business connections which made such specialization reasonable.

彼时中国的汇款银行（“remittance banks”）主要是由山西人经营的票号或票庄（亦称作“Shansi banks”）：

Shansi banks remitted funds for merchants, for the government, and for officials in their private capacities. They sent funds to Peking from those seeking to purchase rank, and they were responsible for handing over the insignia sent down from the capital. From their role as remitter of official funds Shansi banks almost developed into government fiscal agents, holding government funds and disbursing on the instruction of the local official. Certainly their connection with the government was close, and this bond was maintained by their custom of lending to expectant officials, who, when successful, would return the favor by giving the bank official patronage. . . . The Shansi banks’ original capital came from trade, and their access to government funds made it unnecessary for them to accept private funds on deposit. They were at times reluctant to accept such deposits, and even when they did so, they granted but \(5\) to \(8\) per cent per annum, a relatively low interest rate in a country in which pawn shops probably charged \(36\) per cent.

然而，像海关银行这样的半官办银行的存在，使得山西票号无法完全垄断政府业务。

The Haikwan banks were established to receive the customs duties which were paid according to agreements made locally between the foreign consuls at the port and the Chinese superintendent of customs. The bank itself did not undertake commercial banking directly but, not being required to forward its receipts immediately to official control, was able to make funds available either to a local bank under the same management or to pawn shops and other credit institutions, often those in which the local officials had an interest. The profits of the Haikwan banks were derived both from the temporary use of government funds, from meltage fees, and from the difference between the rate of collection and the rate of remittance.

1895年以前，中国与外部世界的货币联系完全依赖于汇兑银行（“exchange banks”）。以汇丰银行为代表的汇兑银行主要从事国际贸易融资业务，并根据伦敦银价制定上海交易所的汇率。

By the end of 1891 the capital of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China was all in gold and the Hongkong Bank had already been working on a gold basis. Indeed, although other banks were forced to write down their capital, the Hongkong Bank’s had increased to \(\$10\) million by 1891. Until 1892 it was not successfully challenged in its position as the only foreign-style local bank, although several proposals for new foreign banks were advanced. A Bank of China, Ltd., with a nominal capital of \(2.5\) million taels was actually announced in the North-China Herald of July 6, 1872. It was to be formed under the British Companies Act of 1862¹² with a Board of Directors in London and a management committee in Shanghai; by August 27, 1872, the idea had been given up. But in the optimistic years which preceded the 1891-92 financial crisis two banking projects were initiated. The Trust and Loan Company of China, Japan, and the Straits was founded in 1890 initially as an investment company, but in the depression it quickly changed to general banking under the title, Bank of China, Japan and the Straits. A desire to formally associate foreign and Chinese capital in a bank led to the formation of the National Bank of China in 1892, but the initiators of the project, the American firm of Russell and Company, long established in the China field, failed in 1891. The project was nevertheless continued, and both banks survived but did not prosper in the period through 1895.

银行的货币创造

清政府除顺治（1644-1661）¹³、咸丰（1851-1861）和末年大清银行以外均未曾发行过纸币（或银行券）。本土银行和外商银行虽然发行银行券，但流通范围并不广。银行不愿意发行和不愿意兑换银行券的潜在原因通常是一个：贵金属的短缺。

银行的活期存款账户能够作为支付手段部分地行使货币职能：

Fixed value in terms of the unit of account was not essential in a premodern monetary system, but the current account was more likely than bullion or coin to maintain this fixed relationship. . . . Current accounts could arise from a tender of coin or bullion, from a transfer from another bank, or from the granting of a loan to a customer. . . . In the nature of Chinese current accounts there is nothing exceptional; the method of their utilization as a means of payment, however, presents problems. . . . The most common method of payment, and Newchwang¹⁴ is a typical example, was by oral notification of the bank that a transfer from one account to another was to be recorded, a fact which would be noted in pass books supplied by the bank. In other cases a written order might be involved, but the parties would have to appear at the bank so that the signature of the drawer could be verified. The bank might then accept the order and it would pass current with a status similar to that of a bank note. . . . The foreign or exchange banks held current accounts on which in the early years they paid a maximum of \(2\) per cent interest; in other respects the accounts were identical in operation to a modern checking system.

As early as 1869 Robert Hart (1835-1911), the Inspector General of the Imperial Maritime Customs, saw clearly where China’s principal economic weakness lay. He wrote, “The first thing to be reformed in China is its taxation. No government can exist without money and China cannot improve so long as her officials have no better way of getting funds than at present¹⁵.” . . . Certain basic tax rates had indeed been settled at the beginning of the dynasty and could not, politically speaking, be changed. But the expenses of the state had increased, and the government required and obtained additional revenue. The problem was not with the size of the revenue but with the system by which it was assessed and collected.

第五章 货币体系与政策

The monetary history of 1644-1850 may be divided roughly into three periods: the establishment of the Ch’ing monetary system in the Shun-chih (1644-1661), K’ang-hsi (1662-1722), and Yung-cheng (1723-1735) periods; the maintenance of the system in the Ch’ien-lung period (1736-1796); and the partial breakdown in the Chia-ch’ing (1797-1820) and Tao-kuang (1821-1850).

With the establishment of the Ch’ing on the throne of China, the two metropolitan mints of the boards of Revenue and Works were set up, and cash cast to weigh \(0.1\) liang of \(70\) per cent copper and \(30\) per cent zinc. The exchange rate with silver was, however, \(700\) coins to one tael. . . . By 1651 when the exchange rate became officially \(1000 : 1\), the weight of the coin had already (in 1645) been changed to \(0.12\) liang. The weight was increased again in 1651 and 1657 to \(0.125\) liang and \(0.14\) liang respectively. . . . In 1684, the twenty-third year of K’ang-hsi, the weight of the coins was reduced to \(0.1\) liang and the composition changed to \(60\) per cent copper and \(40\) per cent zinc. The annual quota of the Board of Revenue mint was raised from \(30\) mao, plus \(3\) mao for the intercalary minth, to \(40\) mao —— a mao being defined as \(12,880\) ch’uan of \(1,000\) coins. In 1702 the weight of the coin was raised again to \(0.14\) liang. The quota was raised to \(41\) mao in 1726 —— the first change of the Yung-cheng period.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Ch’ing monetary policy was the attempt to control the market value of cash by designating the uses to which it was to be put, limiting or enlarging these uses in reaction to changes in the market silver price of the coins. This was not, of course, a policy of day-to-day change —— Ch’ing administration was too ponderous for that; nor is it possible to assess the success of the measures, since accurate price data are not available. The importance of this policy is that it reflects at one time both the capabilities and limitations of the Ch’ing state. The central government was able to establish and promulgate a sound economic policy and to insure initial implementation at least in some areas, but it was not capable of constant supervision, for this would imply the existence of more modern administrative methods, including accurate statistical reporting.

The most serious threat to the traditional monetary system was reflected in the changed exchange rate of cash for silver. In the eighteenth century the rate appears to have fluctuated between \(700\) and \(950\), although lower market values for cash were recorded. By 1850 the market value of cash had fallen to \(1300\) or \(1500\) to the tael, creating disturbances over tax payments and consequent readjustments in monetary and fiscal practice. There have been two general explanations of this: first the deterioration of the coinage, and secondly the export of silver, but both have their difficulties. In the first case, since the supply of copper was severely limited, one would expect that, even with a debased coinage, the exchange rate would at least have been maintained. Nor can the export of silver provide a satisfactory explanation, since the scattered statistics available suggest that the rate in Canton, the port from which the sycee was being exported, remained close to \(1000\), while the fall in the value of cash in other provinces predated the export of silver. Since this involves the “opium question” the explanation has aroused considerable interest, for if it is assumed that the fall in the value of cash was a bad thing, here is another evil which can be ascribed to the import of opium and, therefore, to the West.

脚注

Last updated: 2023-05-01